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I lived through military intervention at the Maré for 14 
months. Favela people know exactly what it means to listen to 
tanks at their door.  
(Marielle Franco, 02.22.2018)3  
Abstract: MINUSTAH representa un punto de inflexión en la vinculación entre la securiti-
zación global y las prácticas humanitarias latinoamericanas. Las responsabilidades milita-
res asumidas en Haití fueron útiles para que las FFAA perfeccionasen capacidades para 
crisis humanitarias. La presencia militar en Haití también contribuyó a la experimentación 
en combate al crimen organizado, una preocupación creciente para actores y organiza-
ciones humanitarias internacionales. Sin embargo, el humanitarismo armado sigue sien-
do un tema controvertido por su potencial impacto negativo en la protección de los De-
rechos Humanos y el fortalecimiento de instituciones democráticas. Este texto plantea un 
terreno común de análisis, vinculando los estudios militares y los de acciones humanita-
rias. Para esto, serán articulados los conceptos de “militares posmodernos” y el de 
“humanitarismo armado” bajo la suposición de que ambos pueden combinarse para 
explicar desarrollos militares latinoamericanos después de la experiencia en Haiti. 
Palabras claves: Humanitarismo, Latino América, Violencia, Seguridad 
Resumen: MINUSTAH represents a benchmark in the link between global securitization 
and humanitarian practices in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional military respon-
sibilities in Haiti became useful to improve and expand the armed forces’ capabilities in 
international humanitarian crises. Military presence in Haiti has also contributed to the 
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experimentation in the fight against organized crime and gangs,a growing concern on the 
radar of international humanitarian organizations and actors. Armed humanitarianism in 
the region, however, has remained controversial due to its potentially negative impact on 
the protection of human rights and the strengthening of democratic institutions. This text 
intends to trace a middle ground around military and humanitarian studies conceptual-
ization by connecting the concepts of “postmodern military forces” and “armed humani-
tarianism”. This is based on the the assumption that both concepts, while focusing on 
different objects, can actually be related to explain the Latin American military experi-
ence in Haiti.  
Key words: Humanitarism, Latin America, Violence, Security 
1. Openning 
At the beginning of 2004, a provisional UN mission (MIF) was deployed in Haitian 
soil after a period of political turmoil that led to the escalation of violence and the fall of 
Jean Betrand Aristides’s administration. After a few months, the temporary mission was 
replaced by the MINUSTAH, which came to be the UN’s fifth Security Council mandated 
mission in Haiti.4 The MINUSTAH mandate involved different tasks, such as: maintaining 
order and security, encouraging national reconciliation and promoting economic and 
social development. MINUSTAH went through three different phases: i) 2004-2010; Latin 
American political and military pro-activism with best results regarding stabilization, 
political normalization and development improvements in Haiti; ii) 2010-2013; break-
down of Haiti institutions and local devastation caused by the humanitarian crisis after 
the earthquake and cholera epidemic; iii) 2014-2018; growing fatigue of UN mission and 
dispersed withdrawal of Latin American troops.  
The prominent participation of Latin American military forces, alongside other con-
tributors, led MINUSTAH to become emblematic as an initiative of regional cooperation 
combined with a multilateral intervention. Latin American presence represented over 
sixty per cent of MINUSTAH troops during most of its duration. All through the MI-
NUSTAH years, ABC+U countries maintained the lead as other countries gradually 
stepped in and out. Besides assuming the Military Command of MINUSTAH, Brazil was 
the main troop contributor during its almost 14 years of duration.5 In its early phase, the 
regional commitment to MINUSTAH carried the illusion that a democratic transition 
                                                          
4 In June 1st, 2004, by Resolution 1542, the MINUSTAH was established for an initial period of six months. 
Previous UN missions in Haiti: MICIVIH, developed jointly with the OAS (Res. A/47/208. April 1993); 
UNMIH (UN’s Mission in Haiti. Res. CS/940. September 1993- June 1996); UNSMIH (UN’s Support Mission 
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March 2000); MICAH (Res. A/54/193. December 1999). 
5 Brazil sent approximately 38,000 men to Haiti. Brazilian military contribution to MINUSTAH started in 
2004 with the envoy of 1210 men. In 2010, Brazil expanded its troop contributions in Haiti from 1282 to 
2188 men. Since 2012 Brazilian contribution downsized annually according to a withdrawal plan approved 
by UNSC resolution. See: Security Council Resolutions S/2004/698, S/2009/439, S/2010/200, S/RES/2070 
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could be exported to Haiti.6 Latin American troops undertook responsibilities related to 
local communications, infrastructure, public health and civil construction. On many occa-
sions, improvised solutions would substitute for the lack of international aid in the con-
struction of roads, schools and hospitals and the improvement of basic sanitary condi-
tions. In this context, MINUSTAH became a benchmark experiment for Latin American 
military forces regarding humanitarian assistance logistics.  
Non-military Latin American cooperation also made major contributions in Haiti. As 
well as Cuba’s medical presence, Venezuela provided key help by supplying energy. The 
first years of MINUSTAH were especially important for regional South-South cooperation 
in the areas of health, food security, education, institutional strengthening and infra-
structure (Malacalza 2017). In addition, Latin American social organisations were active 
participants in this effort– such were the cases of Techo para mi País and Viva Rio. After 
the 2010 earthquake, Latin American cooperation in Haiti decreased dramatically and 
irreversibly. The expanded presence of DAC donors, together with US/EU NGOs, led 
international aids to focus exclusively on basic humanitarian needs.  
Regional footprints blurred even more once MINUSTAH entered a state of fatigue. 
Over-stretching of military presence went hand in hand with the outburst of a cholera 
epidemic and the repeated human rights violations committed by UN troops. In the 
2015-2017 period, individual governments decided to leave Haiti instead of working 
together on a regional coordinated withdrawal. Dispersion was more a reflection of the 
growing political fragmentation in Latin America than of military rivalries.  
The experience in Haiti represented a chance for Latin American military forces to 
share peace-building capacities. For all ex-MINUSTAH contributors, combined regional 
military preparedness in humanitarian relief and stabilization tasks would be positively 
absorbed in other domestic and international realities.  
2. Concepts and contexts  
This text intends to trace a middle ground between military studies and humanitar-
ian action analysis by connecting the concepts of postmodern military forces and armed 
humanitarianism. In order to do this, it begins with the assumption that both concepts 
can be intertwined to address the legacies of the Latin American military experience in 
Haiti.  
The concept of postmodern military forces applies to armed forces prepared to 
face non-traditional menaces posed by post-Cold War security agendas that involve a 
renewed assortment of missions (Moscos, Williams and Segal, 2000:1-11). In this context, 
threats may relate to domestic unrest, terrorism, organized crime, natural disaster, civil 
wars among others. In all cases, interaction with social actors and organizations become 
crucial and adaptation to specific responsibilities is more complex. Expanded civil-military 
articulation is linked to non-traditional military missions, which may be of international 
nature authorized by non-national entities, implying the internationalization of military 
forces. Post-modern military forces must deal with unclear enemies and effectiveness 
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becomes of major importance as a source of mission legitimization. Yet… “Chaos and 
disorder are poor substitutes for an obvious enemy for this purpose” (Williams, 
2000:274).  
The concept of armed humanitarianism applies to the assorted relief actions under-
taken by the military in contexts of humanitarian crisis. While the essence of a postmod-
ern military force rests on the capacity to fulfill duties that involve dealing with society, 
the focus of armed humanitarianism is relief itself and the contribution of military pres-
ence to assure its effectiveness. From a traditional military perspective, the idea of 
armed humanitarianism can be controversial as it infers military presence as part of a 
bigger humanitarian picture. Conceptual and practical collisions are hardly avoidable, 
once this prism affects military autonomy (Pion-Berlin, 2016:120).  
At the present time, the provision of military logistic support plays a crucial part to 
assure access for civilian relief workers to severely affected environments. Logistic exper-
tise allows the military to speed up help in disastrous contexts. They can hurry up search, 
evacuation, demolition, debris removal and reconstruction operations, as well as food 
and water distribution. The combination of new operational approaches with concrete 
developments in conflictive areas opens up a space for new debates regarding the milita-
rization of humanitarian actions and its impact upon the relationship between the mili-
tary and traditional humanitarian actors. Armed humanitarianism brings in new dynamics 
in the interaction between political, military and humanitarian actors that stimulated 
politicization and militarization of humanitarian action (Sezgin and Dijkzeul, 2016:4).  
Differences between Western and non-Western approaches have emerged, entail-
ing questions of military interaction, interoperability and effectiveness (Carperter and 
Kent, 2016:151). Setting the time for armed intervention has become a point of contro-
versy. The question is whether military forces come first or last as providers of humani-
tarian assistance. This debate reflects on recent OCHA guidelines on the Use of Military 
and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex 
Emergencies-the ‘MCDA Guidelines (OCHA, 2006) and the Guidelines on the Use of For-
eign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief, known as the Oslo Guidelines 
(OCHA, 2007). Another conceptual and practical dispute concerns the relationship be-
tween international humanitarian actors and the military (Metcalfe, Giffen and Elhawary, 
2012). Civil-military coordination in UN peace missions nowadays must adjust to multi-
task mandates approved by the Security Council. Responsibilities on the ground show a 
new “interface between military and civilian components of the mission, as well as with 
the humanitarian, development actors in the mission area” (UN DPKO/DFS, 2010. cited in 
Metcalf, Giffen and Elhawary, 2012:2).7 Multi-task missions become even more challeng-
ing in the context of global securitization. 
After 9-11, the “war against poverty” became associated to the “war against ter-
ror” (Easterly, 2016)8 and armed humanitarianism was linked to humanitarian securitiza-
                                                          
7 Statement made by Homeland and Americas’ Security Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defence Paul Stock-
ton at the Inter-American Dialogue policy forum on Western Hemisphere affairs in January, 2011. Availa-
ble: http://www.gsdrc.org/professional-dev/stabilisation/ (Accessed 03.09.2018) 
8 Securitization is understood as a process of threat perception radiation that goes beyond States and 
justifies policies and practices to contain them. Its use in this text follows the premises of the Copenhagen 
School (Waever, 1995; Buzan and Waever, 2003:71-6).  
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tion. Global humanitarian action increased in close connection with post 9-11 foreign 
military intervention. Accordingly, in 2015 the 10 major recipients of humanitarian aid 
were Syria (12,5%), Yemen (9,1%), Jordania (5,6%), South Sudan (5,5%), Iraq (5,2%), Pal-
estine (5,2%), the Democratic Republic of Congo (5%), Lebanon (4,8%), Ethiopia (3,6%) 
and Nepal (2,7%) (Development Initiatives, 2017). Severe humanitarian crises caused by 
military intervention became especially dramatic in the cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Syria, where the premises of human security suffered profound transfiguration (Sanahuja 
and Schunemann, 2012:25). In this context, global threats justified violent responses with 
direct impact upon local population, deepening the casual link between military interven-
tion and humanitarian crises.9  
Besides, securitization of humanitarian practices curtailed the magnanimity of lib-
eral-principled relief as it affects the neutrality/independence/impartiality dogma of 
humanitarian practices.  
Certain scenarios included in the global humanitarian sensor coincide with new se-
curity threats on the international postmodern military radar. This has been the case of 
the violent realities dominated by organized crime, drug traffic and gangs activities. Mili-
tary international/national action to fight organized crime and gangs have added new 
complexities to civil-military coordination in UN-led missions (Liyn, 2018). Several multi-
lateral missions show that UN rules of engagement are hardly realistic when organized 
crime and gang activities represent the central threat targeted by international military 
forces10. Combining stabilization tasks with human rights regulations has been particular-
ly challenging. A myriad of UN missions have had to face such challenges: MINUSTAH in 
Haiti, MONUC in Central African Republic, UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, MONUSC in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, MONUSC, UNMIL in Liberia, and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone (Liyn, 
2018:5). In this context, MINUSTAH is acknowledged for the results obtained in military 
regional leadership and ‘proactive response’ to stabilization responsibilities prescribed by 
the Security Council. (Liyn, 2018:12). Hence, the expanded securitization of humanitarian 
practices coincides with the blurring of frontiers between violence, humanitarian hard-
ship and severe institutional deficits in public security.  
3. The Latin America-Caribbean fit  
Geographical distance from hot international conflict zones curtails Latin American 
involvement with global securitization. Nevertheless, armed violence and public insecuri-
ty has expanded the region’s presence on the securitized humanitarian radar.11 Latin 
America has become the region with the highest record of deaths caused by armed vio-
                                                          
9 See: Pérez de Armiño and Mendia Azcue 2013; Churruca 2016; Giménez Pardo 2017; Sabage and 
Muggah, 2012; Donini et al. 2006; Kent et al. 2016; Barnett and Weiss 2008.  
10 This sort of caveat has been the dominating argument of the “Cruz Report”, elaborated by Brazilian 
General Santos Cruz. See: 
https://peacekeeping.un.org/.../improving_security_of_united_nations_peacekeeper (Accessed 
15.03.2018) 
11 A picture of this mosaic was published by the Institute for Humanitarian Studies together with the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI). See: Mosel, Bennett and Kreb 2016 
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lence (SIPRI, 2015). Brazil alone ranks as the most violent country in the world.12 Orga-
nized crime, drug trafficking and gang activities, particularly in urban peripheries, added 
to police and military repressive responses, are responsible for the death of thousands of 
people, for continuous human rights violations and the collective victimization of civil 
populations. Besides, violence and coercive territorial control have produced massive 
forced migration in different parts of Latin America, Colombia and the Northern triangle - 
United States, Mexico and Guatemala being especially worth mentioning (Gonzalez, 
Mcauliffe and Laczko, 2016; Rangel 2016). In this context, military participation in the 
fight against crime has been on the rise in Latin America. In different contexts, public 
opinion perceives military intervention to combat criminal organizations as a necessary 
solution to offset ineffective and fraudulent police performance (Pion-Berlin and Carre-
ras, 2017). Military crime-fight operations aim to reduce victimization and overcome 
widespread fear in local communities in which police practices have become part of the 
problem. The political and sociological complexities of this process in Central America 
and Mexico have become a topic of expanded concern in academic, activist and journal-
istic critical writings (Trevino-Rangel, 2016). Military engagement in organized crime 
fighting in Central America and Mexico takes place in the context of US cooperation, 
mostly linked to broad antidrug operations. Military intervention in crime-fighting opera-
tions in the Northern part of Latin America does not seem to be related to knowledge 
acquired in PKO. Yet, the connection between military involvement in peace missions and 
crime fighting has become emblematic in the case of Brazil, particularly of Rio de Janeiro. 
Addressing public security deficits as a humanitarian issue is controversial in the 
region. Multilateral organizations - Organization of American State, European Union, 
OCHAUN - and a widespread network of NGOs, with growing presence in the region, 
insist upon perception.13 Local and national security authorities resist accepting to ad-
dress these realities as part of an international humanitarian agenda. At the same time, 
international organizations and actors resent the limited attention to these realities by 
the global humanitarian system, particularly when compared to other regions that re-
ceive more funding and benefit from a vast number of multilateral initiatives (Wilson 
Center, 2017).  
On the other hand, preparedness for humanitarian relief regarding natural disaster 
has increased and ameliorated in Latin American and the Caribbean. An expanded net-
work of multilateral initiatives adds to preventing and pro-active national programs in 
most of the countries in the region14. This development comes hand in hand with the 
                                                          
12 In 2017, the annual rate of homicides in Brazil nearly 60.000. This figure overcomes the added rates of 
United States, China, Europa, Northern Africa, Japan, Indonesia, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
Available: http://metrocosm.com/homicides-brazil-vs-world/ (Accessed:03.20.2018) 
13 In 2015, UNHCR offices were inaugurated in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In July 2016 UNHCH 
and the OAS held a high-level meeting to address the lacking protection conditions for civilians in the 
Northern triangle area of Central American. In June 2017,Humanitarian Practice Network, linked to Over-
seas Development Initiative, edited a special issue of Humanitarian Exchange (n.69), entitled “The human-
itarian consequences of violence in Central America”. Available: https://odihpn.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/he-69-web.pdf (Accessed 07.20.2017) 
14 Among the multilateral organizations dedicated to natural disaster are: CDEMA (Caribbean Association 
for Disaster Control), CAPRADE (Andean committee for disaster prevention and attention), CEPREDENAC 
(Center for coordination of natural disaster prevention in Central America); REHU (Mercosur specialized 
Latin American armed humanitarianism in Haiti and beyond -(197- 211) 
DOSSIER: Desafíos a la Seguridad y la Defensa en el siglo XXI. .219.  
noticeable expansion of military engagement in contexts of humanitarian distress caused 
by natural disaster. Different formats of institutional arrangements have a built-in mili-
tary component in Latin American governmental structures that assist environmental 
emergencies (Pion-Berlin, 2016:113-141; Resdal, 2016:68-78). Armed humanitarianism 
tasks lead to the enhancement of public visibility and to stronger ties with the locals. 
Dissemination of humanitarian action executed by Defense Ministries in each national 
context show a shared interest to “advertise” their accomplishments (Pion-Berlin, Ugues 
and Esparza, 2011). 
Expanded military presence in humanitarian emergencies does reflect a new phase 
in civil-military relations in the region. What tensions may emerge that endanger the rule 
of law and stretch the terrain of “legitimate” use of force and dissuasive methods is yet 
to be further developed in military studies in the region. Besides a priority in national 
defense policies, natural disaster is perceived as a security threat by the OAS15 and has 
been included as a cooperation priority for the South American Defense Council16. Na-
tional and foreign involvement in natural disaster has stimulated regional inter-military 
networking to exchange expertise and share learning processes17. An extensive agenda of 
venues, exercises and collaboration programs take place year-round to update and recip-
rocate capabilities among Latin American armed forces.  
Latin American armed humanitarianism has been coached by the US South Com-
mand18. United States’ military engagement in humanitarian response to natural disaster 
gained unprecedented importance in 2005 after Hurricane Katrine, which devastated the 
states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. Training in relief capabilities became a core 
concern in the preparation of force deployment at home and abroad. The US military has 
built an active agenda of Inter-American coordinated humanitarian action - particularly in 
the Caribbean and Central America. Consequently, humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief have become a central concern in InterAmerican military summits. The US has been 
pushing for a standardized system of military disaster relief and improved coordination 
procedures with civil actors in disaster contexts.19 The Defense Ministry of the Americas has 
                                                                                                                                          
reunion for risk reduction of socio-environmental disaster, civil defense, civil protection and humanitarian 
assistance), MIAH (Humanitarian Assistance Mechanisms for Latin America and the Caribbean), of REDLAC 
(Environmental fund network for Latin America and the Caribbean), CRID (Regional Information Center for 
Disaster in Latin America and the Caribbean) and ROLAC (OCHA Regional Office for Latin America and the 
Caribbean). 
15Available: 
http://www.oas.org/en/sms/docs/declaration%20security%20americas%20rev%201%20%2028%20oct%2
02003%20 (Accessed.03.8.2018) 
16 Available: http://ceed.unasursg.org/Espanol/09-Downloads/Normativa/EstatutoCDS.pdf (Accessed 
03.20.2018)  
17 Available: www.nodal.am/2017/04/delegados-10-paises-la-region-analizan-guatemala-planes-accion-
antedesastresnaturales/> (Accessed 06.17 2017); https://dialogo-americas.com/s/16p2v> (Accessed 
03.07.2018)  
18 Available: www.southcom.mil/> (Accessed 03.04.2018) 
19 This proposal was announced at the Inter-American Dialogue policy forum on Western Hemisphere 
affairs (January 2011) https://www.army-technology.com/features/feature125223 (Accessed 03.15.2018) 
Monica Hirst 
.220.  Relaciones Internacionales – Nº 55/2018 
become a privileged platform to advance in this direction; three out of five topics on the 
2018 agenda relate to questions of humanitarian, environmental and/or disaster relief.20 
In 2010, US military presence in Haiti became “the largest disaster response mis-
sion in modern US military history”21. It is worth mentioning that, in addition to the en-
voy of troops and relief materials, US armed humanitarianism in Haiti included immedi-
ate anti-immigration precautions.22  
4. The Haitian “experiment”  
The mission in Haiti transcended initial expectations for Latin American military 
forces as they were provided with the chance to improve professional assets to engage in 
contexts of violence, chaos and massive distress. Comparable to the benefits of learning 
processes in the 1990’s and the early 21st Century in peacekeeping missions in conflict 
zones, armed humanitarianism in the early 2000’s has added value to a positive image for 
the military in Latin America. During the 2004-2017 period, Haiti was affected by severe 
natural disasters three times (Hurricane Jeanne 2004; Earthquake 2010; Hurricane Mat-
thew 2016) and by the sanitary emergency caused by the cholera outbreak in 2010. Civil-
military forces, particularly interacting with NGO’s and aid agencies in the attendance of 
local population, became crucial in MINUSTAH years. Latin American forces engaged in 
responsibilities of stabilization of local public order that involved traditional police tasks 
of elimination, disarmament and containment of local gangs. Such responsibilities were a 
source of controversy in the ABC countries during the early stage of MINUSTAH (Hirst, 
2009; Tokatlian, 2005). Political questioning focused mainly on the implications of rein-
troducing military forces in public security affairs, considering their responsibility in past 
human right violations. As previously mentioned, Haiti did not represent an exceptional 
case of UN peace missions involvement in crime and gang fighting. Yet it has become an 
emblematic case of experimentation, as revealed by the case of Brazil and the connec-
tion established between MINUSTAH experience and the military intervention in Brazilian 
slums known as favelas. Military intervention in Rio de Janeiro to inhibit crime and drug-
traffic activities had been taking place since the 1990’s23.  
Replication of methods experimented in the periphery of Port au Prince has been 
narrated in the literature on the complexities of public security in Brazil, and vice versa 
(Hirst and Nasser, 2014; Zaluar and Barcellos, 2014). While in Haiti, military forces re-
placed absent police forces, the Haitian Nacional Police (PNH); military intervention in Rio 
                                                          
20 Available: C:\Users\monica hirst\Downloads\https://www.gob.mx/sedena/documentos/xiii-
conference-of-defense-ministers-of-the-americas 
21 Available: https://www.army-technology.com/features/feature125223 (Accessed 03.15.2018)  
22 Coast Guard cutters were sent off of Haiti shores to prevent the population from fleeing to the United 
States.  
Nevis, J. “Border Ward. A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Homeland Security’s Humanitarianism.” 7/24/2013. 
Available: https://nacla.org/blog/2013/7/24/wolf-sheep%25E2%2580%2599s-clothing-
homelandsecurity%25E2%2580%2599s-humanitarianism (Accessed 03.15.2018) 
23 Available: http://www.dw.com/pt-br/ex%C3%A9rcito-no-rio-25-anos-de-fracassos/a-42750301 (Ac-
cessed 03.20.2018)  
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aims to execute tasks local police were/are incapable to perform24. In this context, an 
important percentage of the contingents deployed in the favelas of Rio did have experi-
ence fighting gangs in Haiti.25 According to Brazilian military authorities, “…over time, the 
Brazilian and Haitian situations became complementary. The experience in the Caribbean 
was very important to consolidate the way to approach urban environments densely 
populated with poor infrastructure”26. From this prism, ‘operational conditions’ in Brazil 
are considered much worse than in Haiti, especially considering the differences regarding 
commitment and determination of both UN and local authorities. Following the same 
argument, accomplishments in Haiti have not been easy to replicate in Brazil.  
After the 2010 earthquake, Haitian public security deteriorated dramatically. To-
gether with the loss of local police members and the physical destruction of the Haitian 
prison system, a new generation of gangs emerged with a more fragmented territorial 
presence and new violent practices. In the years to come, Brazilian military faced chal-
lenges that blurred the distinction between stabilization tasks and armed humanitarian-
ism. MINUSTAH police and military contingents dealt simultaneously with a severe hu-
manitarian crisis, the chaotic presence of external actors and gang resurgence. In 2016, 
Hurricane Matthew struck the Southwestern part of the Haitian territory with dramatic 
devastating effects. Even though the zones in Haiti under Brazilian control were not af-
fected, Brazilian battalions immediately engaged in relief actions to ensure help would 
arrive safely.27  
Brazil concluded its mission in Haiti on October 10, 2017 leaving behind more than 
thirteen year of MINUSTAH military command. At the time, withdrawal from Haiti coin-
cided with a renewed and more thorough military intervention in Rio de Janeiro. The 
decision to intervene came from the federal government in response to the escalation of 
violence and fear within a context of institutional and moral collapse of both the local 
police and political authorities. Lessons from the Haitian experience, though overstated 
in the media, became less relevant than the accelerated politicization regarding the deci-
sion itself. In Brazil, military intervention has become growingly controversial in the face 
of human rights violation risks and the utilization of methods that may be contrary to the 
state of law. A broad spectrum of responsibilities assumed in intervention involve dealing 
with local political and institutional entanglements that go far beyond those faced by 
MINUSTAH military command. Armed forces intervention in the fight against crime and 
                                                          
24 Between 2010 and 2017, the Brazilian Armed Forces intervened 11 times in Rio de Janeiro. Available: 
http://www.dw.com/pt-br/ex%C3%A9rcito-no-rio-25-anos-de-fracassos/a-42750301 (Accessed 
03.18.2018) 
25 In 2010, approximately 60% of the troops deployed in the favela Moro do Alemão favela had been 
previously in part of MINUSTAH. Available: https://extra.globo.com/noticias/rio/general-da-brigada-
paraquedista-que-jacomandou-as-tropas-brasileiras-no-haiti-vai-comandar-forca-de-paz-no-alemao-
18418 (Accessed 03.20:2018) 
26 These environments involve “narrow streets, poor constructions, ‘barracos’, hard to find addresses and 
persons, no public authority, strong local leaderships, presence of gangs and organized crimes, no public 
services, etc..” (Author´s interview on 25.03.2018 with General Carlos Alberto Santos Cruz - Force Com-
mander of MINUSTAH 2007-2009 and of MONUSCO 2013-2015; National Public Security Secretary since 
February 2018)  
27 Available: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2016/10/1821459-furação-muda-foco-de-militares-
brasileirosno-haiti.shtml. (Accessed 03.15.2018)  
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drug trafficking in Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, is part of a long process of poverty 
criminalization (Franco, 2014:73-76). An indication of the poor results obtained with 
military presence has been the continuous escalation of political violence, related to the 
nexus between crime, gang and police corruption.  
5. Final remarks  
It seems to be more plausible to acknowledge the importance of MINUSTAH for 
Latin American military experimentation than to perceive the mission as a source of 
transformation for Haiti. The conditions on the island, after more than thirteen years of 
MINUSTAH, are far from promising. Economic and social indicators cause great concern. 
A population of approximately 10.5 million faces dramatic realities, such as: 40% illitera-
cy, 50% below poverty line, and 28% in extreme poverty. Only 12.2% of the Haitian popu-
lation has access to Internet services, 25% enjoy basic sanitation and 50% have access to 
drinking water. Haiti is the country with the poorest infrastructure in the Western Hemi-
sphere; less than 20% of its territory has paved roads28. The chances that Latin America 
can contribute to ameliorate this reality have decreased after MINUSTAH was disman-
tled. The end of the logistic support offered by Latin Americana troops to cooperation 
and humanitarian activities add to the growing disdain of present governments in the 
region to maintain non-military presence in Haiti. The growing irrelevance of ties with 
Latin America will lead to the creation of a new cycle of marginalization for Haiti in the 
international community.  
This text has aimed to show how, as in other parts of the world, armed humanitari-
anism and postmodern military capabilities have been confluent in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. MINUSTAH has been an important point of reference for Latin American 
armed forces in humanitarian relief capacitation in contexts of natural disaster. The ex-
perience in Haiti has also improved military preparedness in the fight against organized 
crime and gang activities. Brazil has provided particularly intense feedback in its experi-
ence regarding public security responsibilities.  
After October 2017, Latin American military experience in Haiti has become a re-
gional legacy that will move beyond MINUSTAH. Military forces represent states which 
“carry their histories around with them and will continue to do so for the foreseeable 
future.” (Williams, 2000:266). This inevitably entails cultural, political and institutional 
coherence between military performance in Haiti and in other international and domes-
tic contexts. 
6. Abbreviations 
ABC- Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
DAC- Development Assistance Committee at OECD 
                                                          
28 UNDATA Haiti Available: http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=haiti#Social (Accessed 
07.11.2017). See also KNOEMA World Data Atlas – Haiti. Available: 
https://knoema.es/atlas/Hait%C3%AD/Tasa-de-desempleo (Accessed 11. 07.2017) 
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DPKO-Department for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN 
MINUJUSTH- United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (2017 - ) 
MINUSTAH- United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti (2004-2017) 
MONUC- United Nations Organization Mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(1999-2010) 
MONUSC- United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo(2010-) 
NGOs – Non-governmental organizations 
OAS- Organization for American States 
OCHA- Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs at the UN 
UNMIL-United Nations Mission for Liberia(2003 -) 
7. References  
Barnett, M., (2011). Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press.  
Pion-Berlin, D., Esparza, D. and Ugues, A. (2011), “Self-advertised military missions in Latin 
America: What is disclosed and why”, Available: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/287186239 (Accessed 
03.12.2018) 
Pion-Berlin, D. (2016), Military Missions in Democratic Latin America. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan  
Pion-Berlin, D. and Carreras, M. (2017), “Armed Forces, Police and Crime-fighting in Latin 
America”, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 3/2017: pp. 3-26. 
Carpenter, S. and Kent, R. (2016), “The Military, the Private Sector and Traditional Humani-
tarian Actors”. In Sezgin, Z. and Dijkzeul, D. (Eds.). The New Humanitarians in 
International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles. New York: 
Routledge, pp. 144-165 
Churruca, C., (2016). “The Changing Context of Humanitarian Action: Key Challenges and 
Issues”. Working Paper, May. 
Development Initiatives. (2016). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2015.  
______. (2017). Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2016.  
Donini, A. et al. (2006), “Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Principles, Power, and Perceptions”. 
Feinstein International Center, Preliminary Report, September. 
Easterly, W., (2016), “The War on Terror vs. the War on Poverty”. The New York Review of 
Books, 24th Nov. 
Eberwein, W.-D. and Reinalda, B. (2016), “A Brief History of Humanitarian Actors and Princi-
ples”. In Sezgin, Z. and Dijkzeul, D. (Eds.). The New Humanitarians in Interna-
tional Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles. New York: Rou-
tledge, pp. 25-41. 
Franco, Marielle (2014), UPP-A redução da favela a três letras; uma analise da política de 
Monica Hirst 
.224.  Relaciones Internacionales – Nº 55/2018 
segurança pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Masters Thesis, Universidade 
Federal Fluminense. 
Frederic, S. (2017), “Explicar la eficacia de una operación de paz, buscando reconocimiento 
como militares: la experiencia de los cascos azules argentinos en Haití”. Re-
vista del Museo de Antropología, 10(1). 
Giménez Pardo, C. (2017). “Luces y sombras en la Acción Humanitaria”. RIECS, 2(1).  
Gobierno de Colombia. (2015). “Plan Estratégico de Cooperación Internacional de Gestión 
del Riesgo de Desastres 2015 – 2018”.  
Gonzalez, E. G. (2015), “Crisis humanitaria, violencia criminal y desplazamiento forzado en el 
Triángulo Norte de Centroamérica”. Revista de Relaciones Internacionales de 
la UNAM, Núm. 122-123, Mayo-Diciembre, pp. 91-132.  
Hirst, M. (2009), “La intervención sudamericana en Haiti” en Hirst, M. Crisis del Estado e 
Intervención Internacional, Buenos Aires: Edhasa, p. 327-359 
Hirst, M. (2017) “Conceitos e práticas da ação humanitária latino-americana no context da 
securitização global”, Estudios Internacionales, Oct. (Special Ed.), p.143-177 
Hirst, M. (2018), “Latin America Farwell to Arms in Haiti.” Note CIBOB, Barcelona (in print) 
IECAH (Instituto de Estudios sobre Conflictos y Acción Humanitaria) and MSF (Médicos Sin 
Fronteras) (2016). La Acción Humanitaria en 2015–2016: un Modelo en Crisis.  
Kenkel, K.M. (2013), “Conclusions: Securing South America’s peace operations acquis post-
MINUSTAH”. In Kenkel, K.M. (Ed.), South America and peace operations, New 
York: Routledge, pp.188-202  
Kent, R. et al. (2016). “Planning from the Future: Is the Humanitarian System Fit for Pur-
pose?” Feinstein International Center 
Gonzalez, E. G., Mcauliffe, M. L. and Laczko, F. (Eds.) (2016), Migrant Smuggling Data and 
Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base, Geneva: IOM 
Malacalza, B. (2015), “Unidad y dispersión. Balance de una década de Co-
operación Sur-Sur Latinoamericana en Haiti” On-line (Acces-
sed: 12.12.2017) 
Metcalfe,V,Hayson,,S and Gordon, G. (2012) Trends and Challenges in Humanitarian Civil-
Military Coordination: A review of the Literature, London: ODI  
Mosel, I., Bennett, C. and Krebs, H. (Eds.) (2016), “Aproximaciones a la historia del humani-
tarismo en América Latina y el Caribe”. HPG Working Paper. Dec. ODI. 
Muggah, R. (2018), “Military intervention won’t solve the violence in Rio de Janeiro”. Avail-
able: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-muggah-brazil-rio-
militarysecurity-20180302-story.html (Accessed 18.03.2018) 
Moskos, C.C., Williams, J.A. and Segal, D.R (1999) “Armed Forces after the Cold War” in 
Moskos, C.C., Williams, J.A. and Segal, D.R., The postmodern military: Armed 
Forces after the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.14-32  
Latin American armed humanitarianism in Haiti and beyond -(197- 211) 
DOSSIER: Desafíos a la Seguridad y la Defensa en el siglo XXI. .225.  
MSF (Médicos Sem Fronteiras) (2017). Forced to Flee Central America’s Northern Triangle: A 
Neglected Humanitarian Crisis. May. 
OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). (2016). World 
Humanitarian Data and Trends 2016.  
Peiró, A.B. et al. (2016). Alerta 2016! Informe sobre conflictos, derechos humanos y cons-
trucción de paz. Barcelona: Icaria. 
Pérez de Armiño, K. and Mendia Azcue, I. (Eds.) (2013), Seguridad Humana: Aportes Críticos 
al Debate Teórico y Político. Madrid: Tecnos. 
Rey, F. (2016) “La acción humanitaria española en América Latina y el Caribe: Origen, evolu-
ción y retos”. In Mosel, Bennetty and Kreb (Eds.), Aproximaciones a la histo-
ria del humanitarismo en América Latina y el Caribe, ODI  
Sabage, K and Muggah, R. (2012). “Urban Violence and Humanitarian Action: Engaging the 
Fragile City”. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, January 19.  
Sanahuja, J. A. and Schünemann, J. (2012), “El nexo seguridad-desarrollo entre la construc-
ción de la paz y la securitización de la ayuda”. In Sanahuja, J.A. (Ed.), Cons-
trucción de la paz, seguridad y desarrollo: Visiones, políticas y actores. Ma-
drid: Editorial Complutense, pp. 17-70. 
Sotomayor, A. (2013), “Democratization and commitment to Peace: South America’s moti-
vation to contribute to peace operations”. In Kenke, K.M., South America and 
Peace Operations: Coming of age. New York: Routedge, pp. 45-63 
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) (2015), SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Ar-
maments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford: Oxford Universi-
ty Press.  
Tokatlian, J.G. (2005), “Haití: una intervención desafortunada”, Analisis político, 18(55), pp. 
39-44, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia.  
Treviño Rangel, J. (2016), “¿De qué hablamos cuando hablamos de la "securitización" de la 
migración internacional en México?: Una crítica”. Foro internacional, 56(2), 
pp. 253-291 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (2016). Global Trends: Forced 
Displacement in 2015.  
United Nations. (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of 
Nations and Communities to Disasters. Extract from the final report of the 
World Conference on Disaster Reduction (A/CONF.206/6).  
______. (2015). Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030.  
Waever, O. (1995), “Securitization and Desecuritization”. In Lipschutz, R.D. (Ed.), On Securi-
ty, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Wilson Center (2017), Painel. The Humanitarian Crisis in Central America. Data: 08, jun. 
2017, Washington, D.C.  
Williams,J.A.(2000) “The Postmodern Military Reconsidered” in Moskos, C.C., Williams, J.A. 
and Segal, D.R (1999) “Armed Forces after the Cold War” in Moskos, C.C., 
Monica Hirst 
.226.  Relaciones Internacionales – Nº 55/2018 
Williams, J.A. and Segal, D.R., The postmodern military: Armed Forces after 
the Cold War. Oxford: Oxford University Press p.265-278 
